Risk and time preferences of entrepreneurs: evidence from a Danish field experiment by Di Girolamo, Amalia et al.
 
 
Risk and time preferences of entrepreneurs:
evidence from a Danish field experiment
Di Girolamo, Amalia; Andersen, Steffen; Harrison, Glenn W.; Lau, Morten I.
DOI:
10.1007/s11238-014-9446-z
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Di Girolamo, A, Andersen, S, Harrison, GW & Lau, MI 2014, 'Risk and time preferences of entrepreneurs:
evidence from a Danish field experiment', Theory and Decision, vol. 77, no. 3, 6, pp. 341-357.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9446-z
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9446-z
Document version confirmed with author March 2016
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
 
 
Risk and Time Preferences of Entrepreneurs: 
 
Evidence from a Danish Field Experiment 
 
 
by 
 
 
Steffen Andersen, Amalia Di Girolamo, Glenn W. Harrison and Morten I. Lau † 
 
 
March 2014 
 
 
 
Abstract. To understand how small business entrepreneurs respond to government policy one has to know their risk 
and time preferences. Are they risk averse, or have high discount rates, such that they are hard to motivate? We have 
conducted a set of field experiments in Denmark that will allow a direct characterization of small business 
entrepreneurs in terms of these traits. We build on experimental tasks that are well established in the literature. The 
results do not suggest that small business entrepreneurs are more or less risk averse than the general population 
under the assumption of Expected Utility Theory. However, we generally find an S-shaped probability weighting 
function for both small business entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, with entrepreneurs being more optimistic 
about the chance of occurrence for the best outcome in lotteries with real monetary outcomes. The results also point 
to a significant differences in individual discount rates between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs: entrepreneurs 
are willing to wait longer for certain rewards than the general population. 
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Government policies are often designed to stimulate the entry of small business entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial activity is clearly 
risky, and often involves short term costs in the expectation of long term gain. To predict the responses to those policies one therefore has to 
know three things about potential entrepreneurs: their risk preferences, their time preferences, and their subjective beliefs about the likelihood 
of profit. If potential entrepreneurs are particularly risk averse, have relatively high discount rates, or hold pessimistic beliefs, they might be 
hard to motivate to start a new business.  
Equally important, when one is normatively evaluating whether entry is a good or a bad thing, one needs to know what motivated 
it. If small business entrepreneurs, for instance, are risk loving, do not discount the future, or hold “optimistic” beliefs about their chances of 
success, it is not obvious that one should encourage entry. Indeed, one of the major themes of policy towards entrepreneurs is to be able to 
differentiate entry decisions that are socially optimal from those that are excessive, and to facilitate the low-cost exit of small business 
entrepreneurs that simply made a mistake. If policy is motivated by the oft-cited claim that there is “excess entry” by entrepreneurs, one must 
have some economically meaningful benchmark for what is meant by “excess.” 
We conducted field experiments in Denmark that will allow a direct characterization of small business entrepreneurs in terms of 
these traits. For controls, we sampled the general adult population of Denmark. To find potential and actual small business entrepreneurs we 
attended trade shows designed for them. We conducted experiments to allow us to infer individual risk attitudes and discount rates, and to 
draw inferences about probability “optimism” or “pessimism.”1 The experimental tasks involve real monetary outcomes to provide 
motivation for truthful elicitation of these characteristics. 
                                                                                 
1 Field experiments of this kind were first undertaken by Elston, Harrison and Rutström [2005] in the United States. They studied risk 
attitudes of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs at a trade show catering to entrepreneurs. They did not elicit discount rates, and their evaluation of the 
risk attitudes did not consider probability optimism or pessimism. Nor was their control group of non-entrepreneurs as representative of the general 
population as ours.  
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Risk attitudes are examined by asking subjects to make decisions over choices that involve two lotteries. For example, the subject 
might be told that they could choose lottery A or lottery B, where lottery A gives them a 50-50 chance of receiving 160 or 200 Danish kroner 
and lottery B gives them a 50-50 chance of receiving 385 or 10 kroner. The subject picks A or B. The typical experimental task gives the subject 
10 such tasks, varying the possibility that the higher prize is received. This design and these parameters were developed by Holt and Laury 
[2002], and later widely applied in the United States, e.g. Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström [2005], and Europe, e.g. Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström [2007] (HLR) and Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp and Wagner [2011]. The typical findings from these experiments 
are that subjects are averse to risk, and that there is considerable individual heterogeneity in risk attitudes. The Danish field experiments of 
HLR [2007] were representative of the adult Danish population, and will thus serve as an ideal comparison group for our experiments with 
entrepreneurs. 
There are several psychological paths generating a risk premium. Under Expected Utility Theory (EUT) the risk premium is 
entirely driven by aversion to variability of outcomes, and is a property of the utility function. However, under Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) 
and Prospect Theory, risk aversion might also be generated by optimism or pessimism about the chances of success. This possibility of 
“probability weighting” can be evaluated from our experiments, and provides a basis for determining if the subjective beliefs of potential 
entrepreneurs are different from the general population.2   
                                                                                 
2 Alternative methods for the direct estimation of subjective beliefs about other naturally occurring events, using popular scoring rules and 
controls for biases due to risk aversion, have been developed. Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2014] review the literature, and develop 
methods that extend the approach we adopt here. These methods could be used to undertake a more holistic evaluation of the subjective beliefs of 
entrepreneurs about other possible events that might motivate their entry, such as the general state of the economy in the future. For instance, Harrison and 
Phillips [2013] elicit subjective belief distributions about major global financial risks, such as equities risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, and commodities 
risk. 
Time preferences are examined by asking subjects to also make a series of choices, in this case over outcomes that differ in terms 
of when they will be received. For example, one option is 300 kroner in 30 days, and another option is 330 kroner in 90 days. If the subject 
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picks the earlier option we can infer that the discount rate is above 10% for 60 days. By varying the choices so that the later option implies 
different discount rates, and verifying that the individual does not have access to perfect capital markets, we can identify the discount rate of 
the individual. In addition, one can vary the time horizon to identify the discount rate function. This method has been widely employed in the 
United States, e.g., Coller and Williams [1999] (CW), and in Denmark, e.g., Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] (HLW). The typical findings 
from these experiments are that subjects have discount rates between 7% and 11% on an annual effective basis, after we control for concave 
utility functions, see Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008][2011][2013] (AHLR). The evidence also points to considerable 
heterogeneity in time preferences across identifiable segments of people. We again have an ideal comparison group in the form of a 
representative sample of the adult Danish population (AHLR [2008]).  
 
1. Experimental Tasks 
We build on experimental tasks that are established in the literature, and have been used to study the behavior of university 
students as well as representative samples of the general adult population in Denmark and elsewhere. Our experimental procedures are 
documented in detail in AHLR [2008], so we focus here just on the basics. Each subject was asked to respond to 1 risk aversion tasks and 3 
discount rate tasks. Each such task involved a series of binary choices, typically 10 per task. Thus each subject typically provides 40 binary 
choices that can be used to infer risk and time preferences. 
 
 
 −4− 
A. Risk Preferences: Measuring Risk Aversion 
Our design poses a series of binary lottery choices in a multiple price list with 10 rows. In the first row, lottery A gives the 
individual a 10% chance of receiving 200 kroner and a 90% chance of receiving 160 kroner, and lottery B gives a 10% chance of receiving 385 
kroner and a 90% chance of receiving 10 kroner. The probability of receiving the high prize in each lottery 
increases by 10% as one moves to the next row in the multiple price list until the last choice is 
between two certain amounts of money. The subject chooses A or B in each row, and one row is later selected at random for 
payout for that subject.3 
We take each of the binary choices of the subject as the data, and estimate the parameters of a latent utility function that explains 
those choices using an appropriate error structure to account for the panel nature of the data. Once the utility function is defined, for 
candidate values of the parameters of that function, we can construct the expected utility of the two gambles, and then use a linking function 
to infer the likelihood of the observed choice. 
 
                                                                                 
3 There is some evidence that rewarding subjects by selecting one task at random for payment does not distort choices under EUT. On the 
other hand, there is some evidence that this random lottery payment protocol can affect inferences about risk preferences under RDU: see Harrison and 
Swarthout [2012]. The reason that this protocol could affect preferences under RDU, but not under EUT, is that it relies on the independence axiom, which 
is precisely the axiom that RDU assumes to be invalid. We assume here that the protocol does not influence inferred risk attitudes. 
B. Time Preferences: Measuring Individual Discount Rates 
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The basic experimental design for eliciting individual discount rates was introduced in CW [1999] and expanded in HLW [2002] 
and AHLR [2008]. Subjects in our experiments were given payoff tables with 10 symmetric intervals. For example, Option A offered 300 
kroner in one month and Option B paid 300 kroner + x kroner in seven months, where x ranged from annual rates of return of 5% to 50% on 
the principal of 300 kroner, compounded quarterly to be consistent with general Danish banking practices on overdraft accounts. The payoff 
tables provided the annual and annual effective interest rates for each payment option, and the experimental instructions defined these terms 
by way of example.4 Subjects were asked to choose between Option A and B for each of the 10 payoff alternatives, and one decision row was 
selected at random to be paid out at the chosen date. If a risk-neutral subject prefers the 300 kroner in one month then we can infer that the 
annual discount rate is higher than x%; otherwise, we can infer that it is x% or less.5 
                                                                                 
4 CW [1999], HLW [2002] and AHLR [2008] provided annual and annual effective interest rates to help subjects compare lab and field 
investments. This feature may reduce comparison errors and CW [1999] find that providing information on interest rates has a significant negative effect on 
elicited discount rates.  
5 We assume that the subject does not have access to perfect capital markets, as explained in CW [1999; p.110] and HLW [2002; p.1607ff.]. 
This assumption is plausible, but also subject to checks from responses to the financial questionnaire that CW [1999], HLW [2002] and AHLR [2008] ask 
each subject to complete. The effects of allowing for field borrowing and lending opportunities on elicited discount rates for risk neutral subjects are 
discussed by CW [1999] and HLW [2002].  
 
 −6− 
We use the multiple-horizon treatment from HLW [2002]. Subjects are asked to evaluate choices over three time horizons that 
are presented in ascending order, and those horizons are drawn at random from a set of 12 possible horizons (1, 2, 3,..., and 12 months). This 
design will allow us to obtain a smooth characterization of the discounting function across the sample for time horizons up to one year. We 
also varied the delay to the sooner payment option on a between-subject basis. One half of the subjects had no delay to the sooner payment 
option, and the other half had a front-end delay of one month. The front-end delay avoids the potential problem of the subject facing extra risk 
or transactions costs with the future income option, as compared to the “instant” income option.6 If the delayed option were to involve such 
additional transactions costs, then the revealed discount rate would include these subjective transactions costs. By having both options 
presented as future income we hold these transactions costs constant. 
Each subject responded to all three discount rate tasks and one task and row was chosen at random to be played out. Future 
payments to subjects were guaranteed by Copenhagen Business School, and made by automatic transfer from the Business School’s bank 
account to the subject’s bank account. This payment procedure is similar to a post-dated check, and automatic transfers between bank 
accounts are a common procedure in Denmark. 
Our estimation strategy is the same as for the lottery task. We take each of the binary choices of the subject as data, and estimate 
the parameters with an error structure that recognizes the panel nature of the data. Risk attitudes and discount rates are estimated jointly. In 
effect, the lottery tasks identify risk attitudes and the intertemporal tasks identify discount rates conditional on the utility functions identified 
from the lottery tasks.  
 
                                                                                 
6 These transactions costs are discussed in CW [1999], and they include things such as remembering to pick up the delayed payment as well 
as the credibility of the money actually being paid in the future. The design of our experiment was intended to make sure that the credibility of receiving the 
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2. Experiment with Entrepreneurs 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
money in the future was high. These considerations may be important in a field context, particularly in less developed countries.  
In September 2006 we conducted a field experiment at the Entrepreneurship Fair in Forum, Copenhagen, organized by the 
Danish IT firm Multidata in collaboration with BG Bank. This fair attracts aspiring and experienced entrepreneurs from all over Denmark 
who attend to exchange ideas and find business partners. The fair was attended by 2,300 visitors and featured 80 exhibitors. Our sample of 
entrepreneurs included firms in agriculture, fishing and quarrying (4%), manufacturing (13%), construction (5%), wholesale and retail trade, 
hotels and restaurants (7%), transport, post and telecommunication (2%), finance and business activities (18%), public and personal services 
(15%), and non-identified sectors (36%). 
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Our experiment was run from a booth set up in the exhibitors’ area of the fair with a Copenhagen Business School banner. The 
booth was run by Andersen, Lau and three students. We started by telling people that this was a study on economic decision making, and if 
they were interested in participating it would take around 15 minutes for which they would receive at least 50 Danish kroner. We then 
explained that they would be presented with 3 types of tasks in economic decision making. Each subject worked privately through the tasks.7 
 
3. Data Description 
Data were collected from 125 subjects, of which 55 subjects reported owning a firm and 70 subjects did not own a firm. Responses 
to the questionnaires allowed us to also classify subjects with respect to their employment status: (i) self-employed only, (ii) part-time 
employment in another firm, (iii) full-time employment in another firm, (iv) actively seeking employment, and (v) unemployed. The second 
column in Table 1 shows the distribution of these employment categories for subjects who own a firm: 29 subjects are self-employed only, 20 
subjects report having part-time or full-time employment in another firm, and 6 subjects are seeking employment or are unemployed. 
                                                                                 
7 The third task was a laboratory version of the Deal and No Deal game, which always followed the risk aversion and discount rate tasks. We 
provide instructions for the risk aversion and discount rate tasks in Appendix A, available in the working paper version at http://cear.gsu.edu. 
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We take the 70 subjects who do not own a firm as our control group, along with the samples from the previous field and lab 
experiments.8 The third column in Table 1 shows the employment status for those subjects at the entrepreneurial fair who do not own a firm. 
Two of those subjects report being self-employed; according to Danish tax law, this means that they are VAT-registered and subject to income 
taxation instead of corporate taxation.  
 
A. Previous Field and Lab Experiments in Denmark 
To provide an even broader and more representative control group, we pool the entrepreneurship data with observations from 
previous Danish field and lab experiments that we conducted between June 2003 and November 2006. Table 2 provides an overview of the 
number of subjects in each experiment. There are 600 participants in total, with 253 participants in the first field experiment (June 2003), 97 
subjects in the second field experiment (September 2003 – November 2004), 90 subjects in the first lab experiment (October 2003), 35 
subjects in the second lab experiment (November 2006), and 125 subjects in the experiment that was conducted at the Entrepreneurship Fair 
in Copenhagen (September 2006).9  
                                                                                 
8 In effect, these 70 subjects allow us to control for possible session effects that might be specific to the field experiments conducted at the 
Entrepreneurship Fair. 
9 The 97 subjects in the second field experiment were randomly selected from a subsample of the 253 subjects who participated in the first 
field experiment. These are “artefactual field experiments” in the terminology by Harrison and List [2004], since we essentially took lab experiments to field 
subjects.    
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The subjects in these experiments were presented with binary choice options using multiple price lists.10 We used treatments 
with relatively high prizes in the risk aversion tasks. Four sets of prizes were used in the two previous field experiment and the two lab 
experiments, and the prizes in the lotteries varied between 50 and 4,500 kroner.11 We added a treatment in the second lab experiment where 
the prizes were scaled by ½ compared to the default with high prizes, and the prizes in the experiment with entrepreneurs were scaled by 1/10 
compared to the default. We used a symmetric menu option in the multiple price list in all the experiments, and added two asymmetric menu 
treatments in the two field experiments and in the first lab experiment.12 The subjects were given a 10% chance of getting paid for one of the 
risk aversion tasks, except in the experiment with entrepreneurs where they were paid for certain. 
The subjects were also presented with multiple price lists of ordered binary choice options in the discounting tasks, and the 
sooner payment option was 3,000 kroner in the two field experiments and two lab experiments. We added a treatment in the second lab 
experiment where the sooner payment option was 1,500 kroner, and the principal was reduced to 300 kroner in the experiment with 
entrepreneurs. The design of symmetric and asymmetric menu treatments in the multiple price lists is similar to the design of the menu 
treatments in the risk aversion tasks, and we allow for asymmetric menu treatments in the two field experiments and first lab experiment.13 
There was a delay to the sooner payment option of one month in all experiments, and we added a treatment with immediate payments in the 
experiment with entrepreneurs. All subjects had a 10% chance of getting paid for one of the discount rate tasks, except in the experiment at 
                                                                                 
10 Appendix B provides an overview of the treatments in the risk aversion and discounting tasks across the various experiments.  
11 The four sets of prizes (in kroner) are as follows, with the two prizes for lottery A listed first and the two prizes for lottery B listed next: (A1: 
2000, 1600; B1: 3850, 100), (A2: 2250, 1500; B2: 4000, 500), (A3: 2000, 1750; B3: 4000, 150), and (A4: 2500, 1000; B4: 4500, 50).  
12 The two asymmetric treatments offered probabilities of (0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and 1) and (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 1), respectively. These 
treatments vary the cardinal scale of the multiple price list and yield six decision rows in each treatment.  
13 The two asymmetric treatments offered annual interest rates of (15%, 25%, 35%, 40%, 45%, and 50%) and (5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 35%, 
and 50%), respectively. The symmetric treatment offers 10 rows with annual interest rates between 5% and 50%. 
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the Entrepreneurship Fair where they were paid for certain.14 Interest rates were compounded quarterly in all experiments.  
                                                                                 
14 The effect of paying subjects for certain or with a 10% chance has been directly evaluated by HLR [2007; fn.16] and AHLR [2011], and 
shown to have no effects on estimated risk attitudes or discount rates in this population. 
Finally, the time horizon varied between 1 and 24 months in the first field experiment, between 1 and 21 months in the second 
field experiment, between 1 and 6 months in the first lab experiment, and between 1 and 12 months in the second lab experiment. The 
experimental designs in these field and lab experiments allow us to estimate exponential and “smoothly hyperbolic” models of discounting, 
and we can use data from the immediate payment option in the experiment with entrepreneurs to identify the quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
specification. We control for non-linear utility and jointly estimate risk and time preferences using different popular specifications of these 
latent preferences in the literature.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
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We use maximum likelihood estimation of structural models of the latent decision process, in which the core parameters that 
define risk attitudes and individual discount rates are estimated. The approach is an extension of the full maximum likelihood specification 
used in AHLR [2008], with modifications for the specifications of the alternative probability weighting functions.15 
 
A. Risk Preferences 
Table 3 shows maximum likelihood estimates of risk attitudes assuming EUT and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).16 We 
condition the coefficient r on dummy variables that control for the second field experiment (DKphase2), the first lab experiment (DKlab1), 
low and high prizes in the second lab experiment (lab2_RA_LO and lab2_RA_HI), the session at the Entrepreneurial Fair (DKentre), and 
firm ownership (firm).  
                                                                                 
15 We review the estimation procedures in Appendix C.  
16 The CRRA specification we use is U(M)(1-r)/(1-r) for r≠1, where r is the CRRA coefficient. With 
this functional form r = 0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r > 0 denotes risk aversion, and r < 0 denotes risk 
seeking behavior. 
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The results show some variation in estimated relative risk aversion across the field and lab experiments. In particular, the 
marginal effect of the dummy variable for the session at the Entrepreneurial Fair is negative: the coefficient of -0.69 is significant with a p-value 
of less than 0.001. The prizes in the entrepreneurship experiment are one-tenth of the default prizes in the two field and two lab experiments, 
so these estimates suggest that relative risk aversion is increasing over income when we pool data from all field and lab sessions. To evaluate 
this inference about relative risk aversion, we also estimate the Expo-Power model by Saha [1993] and find that the estimated α is 0.63 with a 
95% confidence interval between 0.51 and 0.74, implying increasing relative risk aversion.17 The estimated r parameter is 0.25 with a 95% 
confidence interval between 0.15 and 0.35. 
We do not find a significant marginal effect of firm ownership on estimated risk aversion: the coefficient for the CRRA utility 
function is equal to -0.01 and has a p-value of 0.95.18 Using the Expo-Power specification of utility, a test of the joint hypothesis that the 
marginal effect of firm ownership on the estimated r and α coefficients is zero cannot be rejected (p-value=0.99). These results suggest that 
entrepreneurs do not have significantly different risk attitudes than the general population. 
 
B. Optimism or Pessimism 
                                                                                 
17 The Expo-Power function is defined as U(M) = [1-exp(-αM1-r )]/α, where α and r are parameters to be estimated. RRA is then r + α(1-r 
)M1-r, so RRA varies with income if α≠0. This function nests CRRA (as α→0) and CARA (as r→0). 
18 Table C1 in Appendix C shows ML estimations of the same model with control for employment status instead of firm ownership. The 
results suggest that self-employed are less risk averse than full-time employed subjects. The estimated coefficient is equal to -0.295 with a p-value of 0.099.   
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We report estimates of the RDU model with the flexible Prelec function in Table 4.19 The estimated probability weighting 
functions for entrepreneurial firm owners and others in the general population are displayed in Figure 1, and we find that subjects generally 
have an S-shaped probability weighting function.20 We also find a significant effect of firm ownership on subjective probability weighting: the 
marginal effect of firm ownership on the η (φ) parameter has a p-value of 0.016 (0.777), and the joint effect of firm ownership on the η and 
φ parameters is significant with a p-value of 0.04. Since we only have two outcomes in each lottery the probability weight is identical to the 
decision weight for the best outcome, and the decision weight for the worst outcome is one minus that decision weight. We thus infer from 
Figure 1 that entrepreneurs are uniformly more optimistic about the probability of the best outcome than non-entrepreneurs. With greater 
probability optimism comes a greater aversion to variability of outcomes, and there is an increase in the concavity of the utility function of 
entrepreneurs (p-value of 0.124). 
 
C. Time Preferences 
Turning to individual discount rates, Table 5 shows estimates of the exponential discounting model assuming RDU with the 
flexible Prelec function. We control for the curvature of the utility function and jointly estimate risk aversion and discount rates, as theory 
requires. We condition the discount rate on sessions, the immediate payment treatment in the entrepreneurship experiment (ent_nofed), and 
firm ownership. 
                                                                                 
19 Prelec [1998] offers a two-parameter probability weighting function that exhibits considerable flexibility. This function is w(p) = 
exp{-η(-ln p)φ}, and is defined for 0<p<1, η>0 and φ>0. 
20 We also find that the probability weighting function generally has an S-shape when we control for employment status instead of firm 
ownership. 
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We do indeed find a statistically significant effect of firm ownership on estimated discount rates: the estimated coefficient is equal 
to -0.017 with a p-value of 0.084. This result suggests that entrepreneurs are more oriented towards future outcomes and willing to wait longer 
for a certain return than the general population. We also find a significant marginal effect of the variable that controls for the session at the 
Entrepreneurial Fair. Individual discount rates are significantly higher in that session compared to the two field and two lab experiments, and 
the coefficient of 0.23 has a p-value less than 0.001.21 
Finally, Table 6 shows ML estimates from a Quasi-Hyperbolic model.22 We condition the β-parameter on firm ownership and 
do not find any evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The estimated coefficient for the constant term is equal to 0.998, with a standard 
deviation of 0.027 and a 95% confidence interval between 0.945 and 1.051. The marginal effect of firm ownership on β is equal to  -0.009 
with a p-value of  0.79. We cannot reject the hypothesis that β is equal to 1 for both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs (p-value of 0.56 
and 0.83, respectively), which implies that the discounting function is exponential for both groups.23 
 
                                                                                 
21 Prizes in the discount rate tasks are only one-tenth of those in the first field experiment, so we cannot rule out the hypothesis that 
individual discount rates are falling over the range of  income considered in all experiments. This result is consistent with the so-called “magnitude effect” 
on individual discounting. AHLR [2013] provide direct evidence against this hypothesis and magnitude effect in later experiments with Danes.  
22 The discount factor for the Quasi-Hyperbolic specification is defined as DQH(t) = 1 if t=0 and DQH(t) = β/(1+δ)t if t>0, where β<1 implies 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting and β=1 is exponential discounting. 
23 We find similar results in the model with control for employment status. Table C3 reports estimates of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
function assuming RDU. We cannot reject the hypothesis that β=1 when we control for employment status. 
It is possible to condition our core parameters on individual demographic covariates, just like we consider treatment variables. We consider 
total demographic effects of sex, age (below and above 40 years of age), short and long education, and low and high income. Our main results are robust to 
controls for observable individual characteristics: we find a significant effect of firm ownership on subjective probability weighting, a negative association 
with the level of discounting, and no evidence of Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting. The only demographic covariate to have a significant effect on the 
estimated parameters is age. Table C4 shows that younger subjects below 40 years of age have a significantly more concave utility function and a lower 
implied discount rate than those above 40 years of age.   
 
 −16− 
D. Comparison to the Literature 
There have been several attempts to elicit individual risk attitudes of entrepreneurs using financial instruments, but we have not 
come across any studies that investigate the association between entrepreneurship and individual discount rates. Elston, Harrison and 
Rutström [2005] collected data from 182 participants at two conventions for small business entrepreneurs in Atlanta, Georgia and Omaha, 
Nebraska. They elicited individual risk attitudes using the multiple price list design by Holt and Laury [2002], with prizes of $20 and $16 in 
lottery A, and prizes of $1 and $38.50 in lottery B. The results suggest that full-time entrepreneurs have significantly lower aversion to risk than 
part-time entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, and that part-time entrepreneurs are not significantly different in terms of risk attitudes than 
non-entrepreneurs. In particular, the estimated CRRA coefficient for non-entrepreneurs is 0.29 with a standard error of 0.24, and the 
marginal effect of being a full-time entrepreneur is -0.20, which is significantly different from 0 (p-value of 0.068). In comparison, we find that 
the estimated CRRA coefficient for entrepreneurs is equal to 0.14 with a standard error of 0.11, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
entrepreneurs are risk neutral over the income interval in our experiments (p-value of 0.225).  
The other studies that have used the multiple price list design to elicit individual risk attitudes of entrepreneurs rely on 
non-parametric estimation methods. Holm, Opper and Nee [2013] use a randomly selected sample of entrepreneurs from local business 
registers in the Yangzi delta region in China. The sample contains 700 entrepreneurs who have been in business for at least three years and 
employ at least 10 salaried workers, and the control group consists of 200 individuals selected randomly from household registers in the same 
region. The stakes in the lotteries vary between 15 and 580 Chinese yuan, and are comparable to the median daily income for entrepreneurs in 
the sample. They use the number of safe choices in the multiple price list as the dependent variable and find that entrepreneurs do not have 
significantly lower risk aversion than the control group.   
Finally, List and Mason [2011] use a random lottery pair design to infer risk attitudes of CEOs working in the coffee industry in 
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Costa Rica. This design was used by Hey and Orme [1994] to estimate utility functions for individuals under EUT and RDU, inter alia, and is a 
popular method for individual-level estimation since one can include a large number of binary choice tasks in the experimental design. List 
and Mason [2011] presented the subjects with 40 pairs of lotteries in which the stakes were losses24 of $80, $30 or $0 for a group of 29 CEOs 
and losses of $8, $3 or $0 for a control group of 101 undergraduate students in Costa Rica. They estimate risk attitudes for each individual and 
find no evidence of a significant difference in risk attitudes between CEOs and students under the assumption of EUT. However, they 
conclude that there may be some significant differences in risk attitudes under RDU, although it is not clear in what way risk attitudes differ 
between CEOs and students.  
 
5. Conclusion 
                                                                                 
24 These were losses from earnings in an unrelated, prior experimental task. 
We investigate the hypothesis that small business entrepreneurs in Denmark have significantly different individual risk attitudes 
and discount rates than the general population. The results do not suggest that small business entrepreneurs are more or less risk averse than 
the general population under the assumption of EUT. However, we generally find an S-shaped probability weighting function for both small 
business entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, with entrepreneurs being more optimistic about the chance of occurrence for the best outcome 
in lotteries with real monetary outcomes. Thus the nature of the risk attitudes of entrepreneurs differs: they are more optimistic about good 
outcomes than the general population, but also more averse to variability of outcomes. The net results is that they exhibit the same risk 
premium, but for different reasons. The results also point to a significant difference in individual discount rates between entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs: entrepreneurs are willing to wait longer for monetary rewards than the general population.  
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Table 1. Firm Ownership and Employment Status in Entrepreneurship Data 
 
 
 
Firm 
 
No Firm 
 
Self-employed only 
 
29 
 
2 
 
Part-time employment in another firm  
 
8 
 
17 
 
Full-time employment in another firm 
 
12 
 
34 
 
Actively seeking employment 
 
3 
 
10 
 
Unemployed 
 
3 
 
7 
 
Total 
 
55 
 
70 
 
 
 
Table 2. Sample Size in Danish Field and Lab Experiments 
 
Experiment 
 
Subjects 
 
Field 1 
 
253 
 
Field 2 
 
97 
 
Lab 1 
 
90 
 
Lab 2 
 
35 
 
Entrepreneurship 
 
125 
 
All 
 
600 
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Table 3: Estimation of Risk Aversion Assuming EUT and CRRA 
(N=16,250 observations, based on 503 subjects) 
 
  Robust    
Parameters Coefficient Standard  p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
  Error    
      
r      
DKphase2  -0.019 0.126 0.881 -0.266 0.229 
DKlab1  -0.078 0.087 0.371 -0.249 0.093 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.201 0.123 0.104 -0.443 0.042 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.181 0.186 0.329 -0.546 0.183 
DKentre  -0.690 0.107 0.000 -0.900 -0.479 
firm  -0.009 0.141 0.949 -0.285 0.267 
constant  0.837 0.067 0.000 0.707 0.968 
      
LNmuRA      
DKphase2  0.194 0.128 0.129 -0.056 0.444 
DKlab1  -0.628 0.126 0.000 -0.874 -0.382 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.465 0.301 0.123 -1.056 0.125 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.148 0.228 0.515 -0.594 0.298 
DKentre  0.002 0.151 0.987 -0.294 0.299 
constant  -0.991 0.074 0.000 -1.136 -0.846 
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Table 4: Risk Attitudes Assuming RDU with Prelec Probability Weighting 
(N=16,250 observations, based on 503 subjects) 
 
  Robust    
Parameters Coefficient Standard  p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
  Error    
      
r      
DKphase2  0.006 0.169 0.973 -0.326 0.337 
DKlab1  -0.079 0.116 0.494 -0.306 0.148 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.283 0.148 0.056 -0.573 0.007 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.261 0.170 0.124 -0.595 0.072 
DKentre  -0.828 0.158 0.000 -1.138 -0.518 
firm  0.326 0.212 0.124 -0.090 0.742 
constant  0.847 0.083 0.000 0.684 1.009 
      
eta      
DKphase2  -0.179 0.454 0.693 -1.069 0.710 
DKlab1  -0.449 0.415 0.279 -1.262 0.364 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.316 0.689 0.647 -1.667 1.035 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.803 0.622 0.196 -2.022 0.415 
DKentre  0.578 0.970 0.551 -1.323 2.479 
firm  -1.548 0.401 0.000 -2.335 -0.761 
constant  2.417 0.252 0.000 1.923 2.910 
      
phi      
DKphase2  0.157 0.336 0.641 -0.502 0.816 
DKlab1  -0.511 0.288 0.076 -1.076 0.054 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.472 0.482 0.327 -1.416 0.472 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.838 0.317 0.008 -1.460 -0.216 
DKentre  0.924 0.646 0.153 -0.342 2.190 
firm  -0.408 1.457 0.780 -3.264 2.448 
constant  2.394 0.189 0.000 2.024 2.764 
      
LNmuRA      
DKphase2  0.159 0.101 0.115 -0.039 0.358 
DKlab1  -0.538 0.116 0.000 -0.766 -0.311 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.390 0.288 0.175 -0.955 0.174 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.171 0.204 0.400 -0.570 0.228 
DKentre  0.028 0.115 0.806 -0.197 0.253 
constant  -0.759 0.057 0.000 -0.870 -0.647 
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Figure 1. Prelec Probability Weighting Function 
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Table 5. Estimates of Exponential Discounting Function Assuming RDU  
(N= 350,732 observations, based on 503 subjects) 
 
  Robust    
Parameters Coefficient Standard  p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
  Error    
      
r      
DKphase2 -0.001 0.173 0.998 -0.339 0.338 
DKlab1 -0.090 0.118 0.448 -0.322 0.142 
lab2_RA_LO -0.294 0.150 0.050 -0.589 0.000 
lab2_RA_HI -0.271 0.172 0.115 -0.609 0.066 
DKentre -0.799 0.152 0.000 -1.097 -0.501 
firm 0.243 0.181 0.180 -0.112 0.598 
constant 0.859 0.087 0.000 0.689 1.028 
      
eta      
DKphase2 -0.174 0.455 0.702 -1.067 0.718 
DKlab1 -0.439 0.416 0.291 -1.254 0.376 
lab2_RA_LO -0.305 0.690 0.659 -1.658 1.049 
lab2_RA_HI -0.795 0.622 0.201 -2.013 0.424 
DKentre 0.476 0.922 0.606 -1.332 2.283 
firm -1.451 0.414 0.000 -2.263 -0.639 
constant 2.406 0.253 0.000 1.911 2.902 
      
phi      
DKphase2 0.147 0.341 0.665 -0.521 0.815 
DKlab1 -0.528 0.291 0.070 -1.099 0.043 
lab2_RA_LO -0.489 0.483 0.311 -1.436 0.458 
lab2_RA_HI -0.854 0.321 0.008 -1.482 -0.225 
DKentre 0.947 0.643 0.141 -0.312 2.206 
firm -0.545 1.467 0.710 -3.421 2.331 
constant 2.411 0.193 0.000 2.032 2.790 
      
delta      
DKphase2 -0.006 0.026 0.803 -0.057 0.044 
DKlab1 0.009 0.020 0.663 -0.030 0.047 
lab2_IDR_LO 0.044 0.037 0.232 -0.028 0.116 
lab2_IDR_HI 0.085 0.044 0.054 -0.002 0.172 
DKentre 0.228 0.059 0.000 0.112 0.343 
ent_nofed -0.006 0.008 0.415 -0.022 0.009 
firm -0.017 0.010 0.084 -0.036 0.002 
constant 0.048 0.014 0.001 0.020 0.077 
      
LNmuRA      
DKphase2 0.157 0.102 0.122 -0.042 0.357 
DKlab1 -0.541 0.116 0.000 -0.770 -0.313 
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lab2_RA_LO -0.394 0.288 0.172 -0.958 0.171 
lab2_RA_HI -0.174 0.204 0.393 -0.574 0.225 
DKentre 0.028 0.115 0.809 -0.197 0.253 
constant -0.755 0.057 0.000 -0.868 -0.643 
      
LNmuIDR      
DKphase2 -0.323 0.230 0.160 -0.775 0.128 
DKlab1 -1.224 0.163 0.000 -1.544 -0.904 
lab2_IDR_LO -0.624 0.227 0.006 -1.070 -0.178 
lab2_IDR_HI -0.236 0.264 0.371 -0.753 0.281 
DKentre -1.483 0.218 0.000 -1.910 -1.056 
ent_nofed -0.125 0.228 0.583 -0.572 0.322 
constant -1.314 0.114 0.000 -1.539 -1.090 
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Table 6. Estimates of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting Function Assuming RDU 
(N= 350,732 observations, based on 503 subjects) 
 
  Robust    
Parameters Coefficient Standard  p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
  Error    
      
r      
DKphase2  -0.001 0.172 0.997 -0.337 0.336 
DKlab1  -0.090 0.118 0.446 -0.320 0.141 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.294 0.150 0.049 -0.587 -0.001 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.268 0.172 0.120 -0.605 0.070 
DKentre  -0.812 0.153 0.000 -1.112 -0.512 
firm  0.275 0.183 0.134 -0.085 0.634 
constant  0.858 0.085 0.000 0.691 1.026 
      
eta      
DKphase2  -0.174 0.455 0.702 -1.066 0.718 
DKlab1  -0.440 0.416 0.290 -1.255 0.375 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.305 0.690 0.659 -1.658 1.048 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.800 0.621 0.197 -2.016 0.416 
DKentre  0.511 0.934 0.584 -1.319 2.341 
firm  -1.485 0.403 0.000 -2.275 -0.696 
constant  2.407 0.253 0.000 1.911 2.903 
      
phi      
DKphase2  0.147 0.340 0.665 -0.519 0.813 
DKlab1  -0.527 0.291 0.070 -1.097 0.043 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.489 0.483 0.312 -1.435 0.458 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.850 0.320 0.008 -1.478 -0.223 
DKentre  0.934 0.645 0.147 -0.329 2.198 
firm  -0.494 1.468 0.737 -3.371 2.383 
constant  2.410 0.192 0.000 2.033 2.788 
      
delta      
DKphase2  -0.007 0.011 0.532 -0.028 0.014 
DKlab1  -0.011 0.008 0.159 -0.026 0.004 
lab2_IDR_LO  0.004 0.015 0.792 -0.025 0.033 
lab2_IDR_HI  0.030 0.018 0.102 -0.006 0.066 
DKentre  0.085 0.026 0.001 0.034 0.135 
ent_nofed  0.026 0.014 0.056 -0.001 0.053 
firm  -0.009 0.005 0.084 -0.020 0.001 
constant  0.024 0.007 0.001 0.010 0.038 
      
beta      
firm  -0.009 0.032 0.787 -0.070 0.053 
constant  0.998 0.027 0.000 0.945 1.051 
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LNmuRA           
DKphase2  0.157 0.102 0.122 -0.042 0.356 
DKlab1  -0.541 0.116 0.000 -0.769 -0.313 
lab2_RA_LO  -0.393 0.288 0.172 -0.958 0.171 
lab2_RA_HI  -0.173 0.204 0.396 -0.572 0.226 
DKentre  0.027 0.115 0.815 -0.198 0.252 
constant  -0.755 0.057 0.000 -0.868 -0.643 
      
LNmuIDR      
DKphase2  -0.300 0.263 0.253 -0.815 0.215 
DKlab1  -1.251 0.173 0.000 -1.590 -0.912 
lab2_IDR_LO  -0.553 0.275 0.044 -1.092 -0.015 
lab2_IDR_HI  -0.479 0.267 0.073 -1.003 0.045 
DKentre  -1.699 0.233 0.000 -2.155 -1.244 
ent_nofed  -0.260 0.250 0.299 -0.750 0.230 
constant  -0.953 0.125 0.000 -1.198 -0.708 
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Appendix A: Instructions 
(INCLUDED IN ONLINE WORKING PAPER) 
 
A. General Introduction 
 
OUR RESEARCH STUDY 
 
This is a study of economic decision making for academic research purposes. We will 
present you with a series of tasks. For each task you will be asked to select your preferred choice. 
This is not a test. The only right answer is your preferred choice. 
 
If you agree to participate, you will be presented with three different types of tasks. You will 
get a set of written instructions for each type of task, and you will then be asked to choose between 
the relevant alternatives on a computer. 
 
You will be paid 50 kroner for your participation and you will earn additional money. How 
much you earn will depend partly on chance and partly on the choice you make in the tasks we 
present you with. The instructions are simple and you will benefit from following them carefully. 
 
B. Risk Aversion Task 
 
 Task A 
 
An example of your decision task is shown on the right. Each decision is a paired choice 
between an Option A and an Option B. When presented with the actual decisions we ask that you 
select your preferred option in each row and record these in the final column. You will enter your 
choices using a computer. 
 
The decisions all have a similar format. For example, look at Decision 1 at the top. Option 
A pays 60 kroner if the throw of a ten-sided die is 1, and it pays 40 kroner if the throw is 2-10. 
Option B pays 90 kroner if the throw of the die is 1 and 10 kroner if the throw is 2-10. The only 
difference in the nine other decisions is that as you move down the table the chances of the higher 
payoff for each option increase. 
 
You have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for one of these decisions. This will be decided by 
rolling a ten-sided die. If the number 1 is drawn you will be paid for one of your decisions. 
 
If you are to be paid for one of your decisions we will select that decision by rolling the 
ten-sided die a second time. A third draw with the same die determines what the payment is for the 
option you choose. As you will not know in advance which decision may affect your earnings you 
should treat each decision as if it is to count for payment.  
 
For the selected decision we will pay you according to your selected option. You will then 
receive the money at the end of the experiment.  
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C. Discount Rate Task 
 
  Task B 
 
An example of your decision task is shown on the right. Each decision is a paired choice 
between an Option A and an Option B.  When presented with the actual decisions we ask that you 
select your preferred option in each row and record these in the final column. You will enter your 
choices using a computer. 
 
The decisions all have a similar format. For example, look at Decision 1 at the top. Option 
A pays 100 kroner today and Option B pays 105.09 kroner twelve months from now. If you choose 
Option B you will earn an annual return of 5% on the 100 kroner you choose to receive 12 months 
from now. Since this is compounded quarterly your annual effective interest rate is 5.09%. The annual 
effective interest rate is the rate earned on the initial balance, 100 kroner here, plus interest earned on 
all interest accumulated in the preceding compounding periods. The only difference in the other nine 
decisions is that as you move down the table the payoffs for Option B increase.  
 
We will present you with three sets of ten such decision problems. The only difference 
between them is that the payment date for Option B will differ. 
 
You have a 1-in-10 chance of being paid for one of the decision problems in one of the 
three tasks. This will be decided by rolling a ten-sided die. If the number 1 is drawn you will be paid 
for one of your decisions.  
 
If you are to be paid for one of your decisions we will select that decision by first rolling a 
six-sided die numbered 1 to 6 to determine which task is used for your payment. The first task will 
be used for your payment if the number on the die is 1-2, the second task is used if the number on 
the die 3-4, and the third task is used for your payment if the number on the die is 5-6. When the 
task is selected, we will then roll a ten-sided die numbered 1 to 10 to determine which decision is 
used for your payment. As you will not know in advance which decision may affect your earnings 
you should treat each decision as if it is to count for payment. 
 
For the selected decision we will pay you according to your selected option. You will then 
receive the money at the date you choose. You will receive written confirmation of your payment 
today, and we will transfer the money to your personal bank account at the specified date. 
 
D. Socio-demographic Questionnaire 
 
In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive. The questions may seem 
personal, but they will help us analyze the results of the experiments. Your responses are completely 
confidential. Please think carefully about each question and give your best answer. 
 
1. What is your age? ____________ years 
 
2. What is your sex? 
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01 Male 
02 Female 
 
3. Where do you live? 
 
01 Copenhagen including suburbs 
02 Other municipalities in Copenhagen Capital Region 
03 Municipality with towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants 
04 Municipality with towns of 40,000 – 99,999 inhabitants 
05 Municipality with towns of 20,000 – 39,999 inhabitants 
06 Municipality with towns of 10,000 – 19,999 inhabitants 
07 Other 
 
4. What type of residence do you live in? 
 
01 Owner-occupied house 
02 Owner-occupied apartment 
03 Rented house 
04 Rented apartment 
05 Multi-ownership of residence, cooperative 
06 Rented room 
07 Official residence, etc. 
 
5. What has been your primary occupation during the last 12 months? 
 
(Primary occupation is defined as the type of occupation where you spend most of your working 
time.) 
 
01 Farmer 
02 Other self-employed 
03 Assisting spouse 
04 White collar worker 
05 Skilled worker 
06 Unskilled worker 
07 Apprentice 
08 Student 
09 Retired 
10 Unemployed 
11 Other 
 
6. What is your highest level of education? 
 
01 Basic school 
02 General upper secondary education 
03 Vocational upper secondary education 
04 Vocational education and training 
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05 Short higher education 
06 Medium higher education 
07 Long higher education 
 
A. Vocational education and training: 
01 Commercial and clerical vocational courses 
02 Metal manufacturing vocational courses 
03 Construction vocational courses 
04 Graphic vocational courses 
05 Service-related vocational courses 
06 Food-related vocational courses 
07 Health-related auxiliary programs 
08 Other vocational courses 
 
B. Short higher education: 
01 Social sciences and humanities 
02 Technical and natural sciences 
03 Health-related sciences 
04 Other 
 
C. Medium higher education: 
01 Social sciences 
02 Technical and natural sciences 
03 Health-related sciences 
04 Educational courses and humanities 
05 Officers 
 
D. Long higher education: 
01 Social sciences 
02 Technical and natural sciences 
03 Health-related sciences 
04 Educational courses and humanities 
05 Veterinary and agricultural courses 
 
7. What are the characteristics of your household? 
 
(A household is an economic unit, and it is defined as a group of people who live in the same 
residence and each person contributes to general expenditures.)  
 
01 Single under 30 years 
02 Single 30 – 59 years 
03 Single older than 59 years 
04 2 adults, oldest person is under 30 years 
05 2 adults, oldest person is 30 – 59 years 
06 2 adults, oldest person is older than 59 years 
07 Single with children, oldest child 0 – 9 years  
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08 Single with children, oldest child 10 – 17 years  
09 2 adults with children, oldest child 0 – 9 years 
10 2 adults with children, oldest child 10 – 17 years 
11 Household with at least 3 adults 
 
8. How many persons (including children) are there in your household? 
 
01 1 person 
02 2 people 
03 3 people 
04 4 people 
05 5 or more people 
 
9. What was the amount of total income before tax earned in 2005 by all members of your 
household (including children)? 
 
(Consider all forms of income, including salaries, income from unincorporated business enterprises, 
pension scheme contributions, interest earnings and dividends, retirement benefits, student grants, 
scholarship support, social security, unemployment benefits, parental support, alimony, child 
support, and other types of income.) 
 
01 Below 150,000 kroner 
02 150,000 – 299,999 kroner 
03 300,000 – 499,999 kroner 
04 500,000 – 799,999 kroner 
05 800,000 kroner or more 
 
10. How often do you participate in extreme sports?  
 
(Extreme sports include bungee-jumping, para-gliding, parachute jumping, gliding, rafting, diving 
and other dangerous sports.) 
 
01 Never 
02 A few times 
03 Occasionally 
04 Often 
05 Every chance I get 
 
11. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? 
 
01 No 
02 Yes 
 
A. If yes, how much do you smoke in one day? _______ cigarettes 
 
12. What is your height? ______ cm 
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13. What is your weight? ______ kg 
 
14. Do you suffer from stress symptoms such as fatigue, head or chest pain, high blood 
pressure, depression, fear or anxiety? 
 
01 Yes 
02 No 
 
15. Did you vote at the latest general election in February 2005? 
 
01 Yes 
02 No 
 
16. Where in the political spectrum do you consider yourself? 
 
01 Left wing 
02 Center 
03 Right wing 
04 I look at it differently 
05 Don’t know 
 
17. Taking all things together, would you say you are: 
 
01 Very happy 
02 Rather happy 
03 Not very happy 
04 Not at all happy 
 
18. How satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please answer on a scale of 1 to 
10, where 1 is least satisfied and 10 is most satisfied? ______ 
 
E. Entrepreneurship Questionnaire 
 
We will ask you to answer some more questions about yourself. The questions may seem 
personal, but they will help us analyze the results of the experiments. Your responses are completely 
confidential. Please think carefully about each question and give your best answer. 
 
1. What is your current employment status? 
 
01 Self-employed only 
02 Part-time employment in another firm 
03 Full-time employment in another firm 
04 Actively seeking employment 
05 Unemployed 
 
2. Do you own a firm? 
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01 Yes 
02 No 
 
3. How old is your firm, in years? ____________ 
 
4. What type of industry does your firm belong to? 
 
01 Agriculture, fishing and quarrying 
02 Manufacturing 
03 Electricity, gas and water supply 
04 Construction 
05 Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 
06 Transport, post and telecommunication 
07 Finance and business activities 
08 Public and personal services 
09 Activity not stated  
 
5. How many people are employed in your firm, including yourself? ____________ 
 
6. What is the ownership structure of your firm? 
 
01 Sole proprietorship 
02 Partnership and limited partnership 
03 Public limited company 
04 Funds, societies, etc 
05 Private limited company 
06 Co-operative society 
07 Other 
 
7. Have you ever experienced a shortage of capital in running your firm? 
 
01 Never 
02 Rarely 
03  Occasionally 
04 Often 
05 Always 
 
8. Do you have a shortage of capital now? 
 
01 Yes 
02 No 
 
9. How did you primarily finance your firm’s start up? 
 
01 Inheritance 
02 Gift 
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03 Credit cards 
04 Earnings from another job 
05 Grants 
06 Private loan from a bank or person 
07 Other 
 
10. How do you finance your firm now? Enter rough percentages for each: 
 
01 Government loans or grants  __________ percent 
02 Private loans from banks or people __________ percent 
03 Credit cards    __________ percent 
04 Earnings from another job  __________ percent 
05 Cash from operations   __________ percent 
06 Equity capital    __________ percent 
07 Other     __________ percent 
 
11. What would you estimate to be the annual turnover in 2005 of your firm? _____________ 
dollars 
 
12. What proportion of your annual personal income in 2005 is revenue from your firm? 
__________ percent 
 
13. What would you estimate to be the current value of the assets of your firm? 
_________________ dollars 
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Appendix B: Treatments in Danish Field and Lab Experiments 
 (INCLUDED IN ONLINE WORKING PAPER) 
 
Table B1. Treatments in Risk Aversion Tasks 
 
Treatment 
 
Experiment 
 
High prizes (default) 
 
Field 1+2, Lab 1+2 
 
Medium prizes (50% of default) 
 
Lab 2 
 
Low prizes (10% of default) 
 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Symmetric menu in MPL 
 
All 
 
Asymmetric menu in MPL 
 
Field 1+2, Lab 1 
 
 
Table B2. Treatments in Discount Rate Tasks 
 
Treatment 
 
Experiment 
 
High prizes (default) 
 
Field 1+2, Lab 1+2 
 
Medium prizes (50% of default) 
 
Lab 2 
 
Low prizes (10% of default) 
 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Symmetric menu in MPL 
 
All 
 
Asymmetric menu in MPL 
 
Field 1+2, Lab 1 
 
Delayed sooner payment 
 
All 
 
Immediate sooner payment 
 
Entrepreneurship 
 
 
 
Table B3. Time Horizons in Discount Rate Tasks 
 
Experiment 
 
Time Horizons in Months 
 
Field 1 
 
1, 4, 6, 12, 18 and 24 
 
Field 2 
 
1, 3, 7, 9, 13, 15, 19 and 21 
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Lab 1 1, 4 and 6 
 
Lab 2 
 
1, 4, 6 and 12 
 
Entrepreneurship 
 
1, 2,... , 11 and 12 
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Appendix C: Estimation Results with Control for Employment Status 
 (INCLUDED IN ONLINE WORKING PAPER) 
 
Table C1: Estimation of Risk Aversion Assuming EUT and CRRA 
(N=16,250 observations, based on 503 subjects) 
 
  Robust    
Parameters Coefficient Standard  p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
  Error    
      
r      
DKphase2 -0.019 0.126 0.881 -0.266 0.229 
DKlab1 -0.078 0.087 0.371 -0.249 0.093 
lab2_RA_LO -0.201 0.123 0.104 -0.443 0.042 
lab2_RA_HI -0.181 0.186 0.329 -0.546 0.183 
DKentre -0.576 0.131 0.000 -0.832 -0.320 
self_emp -0.295 0.178 0.099 -0.644 0.055 
part_time -0.086 0.180 0.633 -0.439 0.267 
no_emp -0.155 0.211 0.463 -0.570 0.259 
constant 0.837 0.067 0.000 0.707 0.968 
      
LNmuRA      
DKphase2 0.194 0.128 0.129 -0.056 0.444 
DKlab1 -0.628 0.126 0.000 -0.874 -0.382 
lab2_RA_LO -0.465 0.301 0.123 -1.056 0.125 
lab2_RA_HI -0.148 0.228 0.515 -0.594 0.298 
DKentre 0.000 0.152 1.000 -0.298 0.298 
constant -0.991 0.074 0.000 -1.136 -0.846 
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Table C2: Estimates of Risk Aversion Assuming RDU and Prelec Probability Weighting 
(N=16,250 observations, based on 503 subjects) 
 
  Robust    
Parameter Coefficient Standard  p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
  Error    
      
r      
DKphase2 0.006 0.169 0.973 -0.326 0.337 
DKlab1 -0.079 0.116 0.494 -0.306 0.148 
lab2_RA_LO -0.283 0.148 0.056 -0.573 0.007 
lab2_RA_HI -0.261 0.170 0.124 -0.595 0.072 
DKentre -0.664 0.150 0.000 -0.958 -0.370 
self_emp -0.080 0.256 0.754 -0.582 0.421 
constant 0.847 0.083 0.000 0.684 1.009 
      
eta      
DKphase2 -0.179 0.454 0.693 -1.069 0.710 
DKlab1 -0.449 0.415 0.279 -1.262 0.364 
lab2_RA_LO -0.316 0.689 0.647 -1.667 1.035 
lab2_RA_HI -0.803 0.622 0.196 -2.022 0.415 
DKentre -0.040 0.631 0.950 -1.276 1.197 
self_emp -1.328 0.512 0.009 -2.332 -0.325 
constant 2.417 0.252 0.000 1.923 2.910 
      
phi      
DKphase2 0.157 0.336 0.641 -0.502 0.816 
DKlab1 -0.511 0.288 0.076 -1.076 0.054 
lab2_RA_LO -0.472 0.482 0.327 -1.416 0.472 
lab2_RA_HI -0.838 0.317 0.008 -1.460 -0.216 
DKentre 0.966 0.564 0.087 -0.139 2.071 
self_emp -0.794 1.578 0.615 -3.887 2.299 
constant 2.394 0.189 0.000 2.024 2.764 
      
LNmuRA      
DKphase2 0.159 0.101 0.115 -0.039 0.358 
DKlab1 -0.538 0.116 0.000 -0.766 -0.311 
lab2_RA_LO -0.390 0.288 0.175 -0.955 0.174 
lab2_RA_HI -0.171 0.204 0.400 -0.570 0.228 
DKentre 0.039 0.115 0.734 -0.187 0.265 
constant -0.759 0.057 0.000 -0.870 -0.647 
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Table C3: Estimates of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting Function Assuming RDU 
(N=350,732 observations, based on 503 subjects) 
 
  Robust    
Parameters Coefficient Standard  p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
  Error    
      
r      
DKphase2 -0.001 0.172 0.997 -0.337 0.336 
DKlab1 -0.090 0.118 0.446 -0.320 0.141 
lab2_RA_LO -0.294 0.150 0.049 -0.587 -0.001 
lab2_RA_HI -0.268 0.172 0.120 -0.605 0.070 
DKentre -0.678 0.149 0.000 -0.970 -0.386 
self_emp -0.048 0.205 0.815 -0.450 0.354 
constant 0.858 0.085 0.000 0.691 1.026 
      
eta      
DKphase2 -0.174 0.455 0.702 -1.066 0.718 
DKlab1 -0.440 0.416 0.290 -1.255 0.375 
lab2_RA_LO -0.305 0.690 0.659 -1.658 1.048 
lab2_RA_HI -0.800 0.621 0.197 -2.016 0.416 
DKentre -0.022 0.630 0.972 -1.257 1.213 
self_emp -1.364 0.458 0.003 -2.263 -0.466 
constant 2.407 0.253 0.000 1.911 2.903 
      
phi      
DKphase2 0.147 0.340 0.665 -0.519 0.813 
DKlab1 -0.527 0.291 0.070 -1.097 0.043 
lab2_RA_LO -0.489 0.483 0.312 -1.435 0.458 
lab2_RA_HI -0.850 0.320 0.008 -1.478 -0.223 
DKentre 0.943 0.566 0.096 -0.166 2.052 
self_emp -0.747 1.622 0.645 -3.927 2.433 
constant 2.410 0.192 0.000 2.033 2.788 
      
delta      
DKphase2 -0.007 0.011 0.532 -0.028 0.014 
DKlab1 -0.011 0.008 0.159 -0.026 0.004 
lab2_IDR_LO 0.004 0.015 0.792 -0.025 0.033 
lab2_IDR_HI 0.030 0.018 0.102 -0.006 0.066 
DKentre 0.064 0.020 0.002 0.024 0.104 
ent_nofed 0.025 0.013 0.058 -0.001 0.051 
self_emp 0.002 0.009 0.829 -0.016 0.020 
constant 0.024 0.007 0.001 0.010 0.038 
      
beta      
self_emp -0.005 0.036 0.881 -0.076 0.065 
constant 0.993 0.018 0.000 0.957 1.029 
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LNmuRA      
DKphase2 0.157 0.102 0.122 -0.042 0.356 
DKlab1 -0.541 0.116 0.000 -0.769 -0.313 
lab2_RA_LO -0.393 0.288 0.172 -0.958 0.171 
lab2_RA_HI -0.173 0.204 0.396 -0.572 0.226 
DKentre 0.035 0.115 0.759 -0.191 0.262 
constant -0.755 0.057 0.000 -0.868 -0.643 
      
LNmuIDR      
DKphase2 -0.300 0.263 0.253 -0.815 0.215 
DKlab1 -1.251 0.173 0.000 -1.590 -0.912 
lab2_IDR_LO -0.553 0.275 0.044 -1.092 -0.015 
lab2_IDR_HI -0.479 0.267 0.073 -1.003 0.045 
DKentre -1.624 0.251 0.000 -2.116 -1.131 
ent_nofed -0.436 0.231 0.059 -0.889 0.017 
constant -0.958 0.123 0.000 -1.199 -0.716 
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Table C4: Demographic Effects: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting Function Assuming RDU 
(N=350,732 observations, based on 503 subjects) 
 
  Robust    
Parameters Coefficient Standard  p-value [95% Confidence Interval] 
  Error    
      
r      
female 0.844 0.089 0.000 0.670 1.019 
male 0.848 0.097 0.000 0.657 1.038 
younger 1.057 0.095 0.000 0.871 1.242 
older 0.773 0.099 0.000 0.579 0.967 
shortedu 0.833 0.091 0.000 0.655 1.011 
longedu 0.908 0.104 0.000 0.704 1.111 
IncLow 0.822 0.102 0.000 0.621 1.022 
IncHigh 0.906 0.084 0.000 0.741 1.071 
      
eta      
female 2.396 0.392 0.000 1.627 3.166 
male 2.360 0.297 0.003 1.778 2.941 
younger 3.881 0.610 0.000 2.685 5.077 
older 1.709 0.236 0.000 1.246 2.171 
shortedu 2.170 0.283 0.000 1.616 2.725 
longedu 2.880 0.494 0.000  1.912 3.848 
IncLow 2.409 0.267 0.000 1.886 2.932 
IncHigh 2.439 0.580 0.000  1.302 3.576 
      
phi      
female 2.172 0.263 0.000 1.656 2.688 
male 2.563 0.211 0.000 2.149 2.976 
younger 2.550 0.257 0.000 2.047 3.052 
older 2.240 0.327 0.000 1.599 2.880 
shortedu 2.319 0.206 0.000 1.916 2.723 
longedu 2.579 0.350 0.000 1.892 3.265 
IncLow 2.357 0.219 0.000 1.927 2.787 
IncHigh 2.483 0.388 0.000  1.722  3.243 
       
delta      
female 0.027 0.008 0.001 0.011 0.042 
male 0.024 0.008 0.029 0.008 0.039 
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younger 0.010 0.005 0.035 0.001 0.019 
older 0.034 0.010 0.001 0.013 0.054 
shortedu 0.028 0.008 0.001 0.012 0.045 
longedu 0.017 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.031 
IncLow 0.029 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.048 
IncHigh 0.019 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.031 
      
beta      
female 0.990 0.037 0.000 0.919 1.062 
male 1.001 0.031 0.000 0.940 1.061 
younger 0.958 0.040 0.000 0.880 1.037 
older 0.981 0.071 0.000 0.842  1.120 
shortedu 0.993 0.036 0.000 0.922 1.065 
longedu 0.985 0.028 0.000 0.929 1.040 
IncLow 0.992 0.035 0.000 0.924 1.059 
IncHigh 0.987 0.035 0.000 0.918 1.055 
      
 
Note: Variable female indicates a female; younger is someone aged less than 40; longedu is someone who has 
substantial higher education (completion of medium-cycle or longer-cycle higher education); and IncHigh is someone with 
household income in 2009 of 500,000 kroner or more. 
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Appendix D: Econometric Specification 
(INCLUDED IN ONLINE WORKING PAPER) 
 
A. Estimating the Utility Function 
Assume for the moment that utility of income M is defined by 
 U(M) = M(1-r)/(1-r) (1) 
where M is the lottery prize and r≠1 is a parameter to be estimated. Thus r is the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA): r=0 
corresponds to risk neutrality, r<0 denotes risk loving, and r>0 denotes risk aversion. Let there be two possible outcomes in a lottery. Under 
EUT the probabilities for each monetary outcome Mj, p(Mj), are those that are induced by the experimenter, so expected utility is simply the 
probability weighted utility of each outcome in each lottery i: 
 EUi = [ p(M1) × U(M1) ] + [ p(M2) × U(M2) ] (2) 
The EU for each lottery pair is calculated for a candidate estimate of r, and the index 
 ∇EU = EUB - EUA (3) 
calculated, where EUA is option A and EUB is option B as presented to subjects. This latent index, based on latent preferences, is then linked to 
observed choices using the cumulative logistic distribution function Λ(∇EU). This “logit” function takes any argument between ±∞ and 
transforms it into a number between 0 and 1. The logit link function is: 
 prob(choose lottery B) = Λ(∇EU) (4) 
The index defined by (3) is linked to the observed choices by specifying that the B lottery is chosen when Λ(∇EU)>½, which is implied by 
(4). 
Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA specifications being true, depends on the 
estimates of r given the above statistical specification and the observed choices. The conditional log-likelihood is then 
 ln L(r; y, ω, X) = Σi [ (ln Λ(∇EU)×I(yi = 1)) + (ln (1-Λ(∇EU))×I(yi = -1)) ] (5) 
where I(⋅) is the indicator function, yi =1(-1) denotes the choice of the Option B (A) lottery in risk aversion task i, and X is a vector of 
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treatments and individual characteristics. The parameter r is defined as a linear function of the characteristics in vector X.25 
                                                                                 
25 Harrison and Rutström [2008; Appendix F] review procedures that can be used to estimate structural models of this kind, as well as more 
complex non-EUT models. It is a simple matter to correct for stratified survey responses, multiple responses from the same subject (“clustering”), or 
heteroskedasticity, as needed. 
Extensions of the basic model are easy to implement, and this is the major attraction of the structural estimation approach. For 
example, one can easily extend the functional forms of utility to allow for varying degrees of relative risk aversion (RRA). Consider, as one 
important example, the Expo-Power (EP) utility function proposed by Saha [1993]. Following Holt and Laury [2002], the EP function is 
defined as 
 U(M) = [1-exp(-αM1-r )]/α, (1') 
where α and r are parameters to be estimated. RRA is then r + α(1-r )M1-r, so RRA varies with income if α≠0. This function nests CRRA (as 
α→0) and CARA (as r→0). 
An important extension of the core model is to allow for subjects to make some errors. The notion of error is one that has already 
been encountered in the form of the statistical assumption that the probability of choosing a lottery is not 1 when the EU of that lottery 
exceeds the EU of the other lottery. This assumption is clear in the use of a link function between the latent index ∇EU and the probability of 
picking one or other lottery; in the case of the logistic CDF, this link function is Λ(∇EU). If there were no errors from the perspective of 
EUT, this function would be a step function: zero for all values of ∇EU<0, anywhere between 0 and 1 for ∇EU=0, and 1 for all values of 
∇EU>0.  
We also allow for “behavioral errors” using a specification originally due to Fechner and popularized by Hey and Orme [1994]. 
This behavioral error specification posits the latent index 
 ∇EU = (EUB - EUA)/μ (3′) 
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instead of (3), where μ is a structural “noise parameter” used to allow some errors from the perspective of the deterministic EUT model. This 
is just one of several different types of error story that could be used, and Wilcox [2008] provides a masterful review of the implications of the 
alternatives.26 As μ→0 this specification collapses to the deterministic choice EUT model, where the choice is strictly determined by the EU 
of the two lotteries; but as μ gets larger and larger the choice essentially becomes random. When μ=1 this specification collapses to (3), where 
the probability of picking one lottery is given by the ratio of the EU of one lottery to the sum of the EU of both lotteries. Thus μ can be viewed 
as a parameter that flattens out the link functions as it gets larger. 
                                                                                 
26 Some specifications place the error at the final choice between one lottery or after the subject has decided which one has the higher 
expected utility; some place the error earlier, on the comparison of preferences leading to the choice; and some place the error even earlier, on the 
determination of the expected utility of each lottery. 
An important contribution to the characterization of behavioral errors is the “contextual error” specification proposed by Wilcox 
[2011]. It is designed to allow robust inferences about the primitive “more stochastically risk averse than.” It posits the latent index 
 ∇EU = ((EUB - EUA)/v)/μ (3″) 
instead of (3′), where v is a new, normalizing term for each lottery pair A and B. The normalizing term v is defined as the maximum utility 
over all prizes in this lottery pair minus the minimum utility over all prizes in this lottery pair. The value of v varies, in principle, from lottery 
choice to lottery choice: hence it is said to be “contextual.” For the Fechner specification, dividing by v ensures that the normalized EU 
difference [(EUB - EUA)/v] remains in the unit interval. 
The likelihood of the risk aversion task responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA specifications being true, depends on the 
estimates of r and μ. The conditional log-likelihood is 
 ln L (r, μ; y, X) = Σi [ (ln Λ(∇EU)×I(yi=1)) + (ln (1-Λ(∇EU))×I(yi=-1)) ] (6) 
where yi =1(-1) denotes the choice of Option B (A) in risk aversion task i, and X is a vector of individual characteristics. The value of v depends 
on the data, and not on the estimated preference parameters r and μ. 
 
B. Estimating the Discounting Function 
Assume EUT holds for choices over risky alternatives and that discounting is exponential. A subject is indifferent between two 
income options Mt and Mt+τ if and only if 
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 (1/(1+δ)t) U(Mt) = (1/(1+δ)τ) U(Mt+τ) (7) 
where U(Mt) is the utility of monetary outcome Mt for delivery at time t, δ is the discount rate, τ is the horizon for delivery of the later 
monetary outcome at time t+τ, and the utility function U is separable and stationary over time. The left hand side of equation (7) is the 
discounted utility of receiving the monetary outcome Mt at time t, and the right hand side is the discounted utility of receiving the outcome 
Mt+τ at time t+τ. Thus δ is the discount rate that equalizes the present value of the utility of the two monetary outcomes Mt and Mt+τ. 
We can write out the likelihood function for the choices that our subjects made and jointly estimate the risk parameter r in 
equation (1) and the discount rate parameter δ in (7). We use the same stochastic error specification as in (3′), albeit with a different Fechner 
error term υ for the discount choices. Instead of (3′) we have 
 ∇PV = (PVB - PVA)/η, (8) 
where the discounted utility of Option A is given by 
 PVA = (1/(1+δ)t)(MA)(1-r)/(1-r) (9) 
and the discounted utility of Option B is 
 PVB =(1/(1+δ)t+τ) (MB)(1-r)/(1-r), (10) 
and MA and MB are the monetary amounts in the choice tasks presented to subjects. The parameter η captures noise for the discount rate 
choices, just as μ was a noise parameter for the risk aversion choices.27 We assume here that the utility function is stable over time and is 
perceived ex ante to be stable over time.28 We also assume that the parameter r<1, to ensure that δ>0. 
Thus the likelihood of the discount rate responses, conditional on the EUT, CRRA and exponential discounting specifications 
being true, depends on the estimates of r, δ, μ and η, given the assumed value of ω and the observed choices. The conditional log-likelihood 
is 
                                                                                 
27 It is not obvious that μ=η, since these are cognitively different tasks. Our own priors are that the risk aversion tasks are harder, since they 
involve four outcomes compared to two outcomes in the discount rate tasks, so we would expect μ>η. Error structures are things one should always be 
agnostic about since they capture one’s modeling ignorance, so we allow the error terms to differ between risk and discount rate tasks. 
28 Direct evidence for the former proposition is provided by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008], who examine the temporal 
stability of risk attitudes in the Danish population. The second proposition is a more delicate matter: even if utility functions are stable over time, they may 
not be subjectively perceived to be, and that is what matters for use to assume that the same r that appears in (1) appears in (9) and (10). When there is no 
front end delay, this assumption is immediate for (9), but not otherwise. But whether or not individuals suffer from a “projection bias” is a deep matter, 
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 ln L (r, δ, μ, η; y, ω, X) = Σi [ (ln Λ(∇PV)×I(yi=1)) + (ln (1-Λ(∇PV))×I(yi=-1)) ] (11) 
where yi =1(-1) again denotes the choice of Option B (A) in discount rate task i, and X is a vector of individual characteristics. 
The joint likelihood of the risk aversion and discount rate responses is then 
 ln L (r, δ, μ, η; y, ω, X) = ln LRA + ln LDR (12) 
where LRA is defined by (6) and LDR is defined by (11). This expression can then be maximized using standard numerical methods. 
Nothing in this inferential procedure relied on the use of EUT, or the CRRA functional form. Nor did anything rely on the use of 
the exponential discounting function. These methods generalize immediately to alternative models of decision making under risk, and to 
alternative discounting functions. We illustrate both extensions below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
demanding more research: see Ainslie [1992; p. 144-179, §6.3], Kirby and Guastello [2001] and Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin [2003]. 
C. Estimating Subjective Optimism or Pessimism 
 
 −Α22− 
  We also provide estimates from a RDU model, to ascertain if entrepreneurs exhibit optimism or pessimism in comparison to the 
general population.29 To calculate decision weights under RDU one replaces expected utility EUi = Σk=1,K [ pk × uk ] with RDU 
 RDUi = Σk=1, K [ wk × uk ], (13) 
where 
 wi = ω(pi + ... + pn) - ω(pi+1 + ... + pn) (14a) 
for i=1,... , n-1, and 
 wi = ω(pi) (14b) 
for i=n, the subscript indicates outcomes ranked from worst to best, and where ω(p) is some probability weighting function. 
Picking the right probability weighting function is obviously important for RDU specifications. The simplest specification is the 
power function 
 ω(p) = pη (15) 
This probability weighting function is useful pedagogically, since values of η>1 imply pessimism with respect to lottery probabilities, and 
values of η<1 imply optimism. Ceteris paribus the utility function curvature, estimates of η<1 provide an additional psychological source for a 
positive risk premium (since better prizes are given lower decision weight than their objective probabilities, and poorer prizes are given higher 
decision weight). The “inverse-S” weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman [1992] has also been widely employed. It is 
assumed to have well-behaved endpoints such that ω(0)=0 and ω(1)=1 and to imply weights 
 ω(p) = pγ/[ pγ + (1-p)γ ]1/γ (16) 
                                                                                 
29 When we use the short-hand expression “general population” in comparison to entrepreneurs owning firms we actually mean the general 
population other than those entrepreneurs. 
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for 0<p<1.30 Finally, Prelec [1998] presents a two-parameter probability weighting function that includes (15) and (16) as special cases. This 
function is written as  
 ω(p) = exp{-η(-ln(p))φ} (17) 
and is defined for 0<p<1, η>0 and φ>0. We generally use the flexible specification (17). 
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Appendix E. Literature Review on Entrepeneurship and Risk Taking 
(INCLUDED IN ONLINE WORKING PAPER) 
 
Schade [2005; p.417] provides a survey of experimental studies in entrepreneurship and lists 14 studies, only 2 of which actually 
use real entrepreneurs. Of the remaining 12 studies, students are the most common type of experimental subject; there are obvious doubts 
about the value of using students to generalize about real entrepreneurs, as correctly noted by Robinson, Hueffner and Hunt [1991]. 
Moreover, the studies discussed by Schade [2005] all use hypothetical surveys, and none of the tasks were incentivized in the sense that 
subjects earned more or less money depending on different choices. The use of real, controlled incentives has been a hallmark of experimental 
economics since Smith [1982] defined the “salience” and “dominance” precepts of an experimental micro-economy, and there is clear, direct 
evidence of bias from hypothetical studies of risk aversion (Holt and Laury [2002][2005] and Harrison [2006a]).31 
Several studies have used experimental methods with real incentives to study the behavior of entrepreneurs in controlled 
laboratory settings. We have not come across any studies on entrepreneurship and individual discount rates, and focus here on experimental 
studies that elicit individual risk attitudes. These studies rely on three methods to elicit individual risk attitudes, reviewed by Harrison and 
Rutström [2008a]: the multiple price list design, the random lottery pair design, and the ordered lottery selection design.  
                                                                                 
31 The studies reviewed by Schade [2005] are better described as using the so-called “questionnaire-experimental method,” where different 
hypothetical survey questions are exogenously posed to subjects with some experimental design. Amiel and Cowell [1999] illustrate the method, and note 
that their “approach involves presenting individuals with questionnaires in a way that uses many of the features of experimental methodology” (p. 24). The 
use of hypothetical questionnaires also has a long tradition in psychology and environmental valuation: see Harrison [2006a][2006b], Harrison and 
Rutström [2008b] and Hertwig and Ortmann [2001] for surveys of experimental evidence on the biases introduced by eliciting hypothetical responses. 
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The most popular elicitation method of risk attitudes in studies of entrepreneurs is the multiple price list (MPL) design 
popularized by Holt and Laury [2002].32 Subjects are presented with an array of binary choice tasks, ordered by the probability of the high 
prize, and asked to pick their preferred lottery in each decision task. The binary choice tasks are organized in an MPL, which typically contains 
10 decision tasks. One decision task is then picked at random and the preferred lottery in the selected decision task is played out for actual 
payment. This elicitation method has been applied to study entrepreneurs by Elston, Harrison and Rutström [2005], Holm, Opper and Nee 
[2013] and Sandri, Schade, Musshoff and Odeling [2010].  
One can analyze the data from this elicitation method in various ways. Elston, Harrison and Rutström [2005] use maximum 
likelihood estimation of an interval regression model with relative risk aversion as the dependent variable. The stakes in the lotteries vary 
between $1 and $38.50, and are equal to ten times the amounts used in the 1x treatment in Holt and Laury [2002]. The experiments took place 
at two conventions for small business entrepreneurs in Atlanta, Georgia and Omaha, Nebraska. Data is collected from 182 individuals, where 
42 are classified as being full-time entrepreneurs, 38 are classified as part-time entrepreneurs, 92 are classified as salaried non-entrepreneurs, 
and 10 do not fit in any of those categories. They find that full-time entrepreneurs have significantly lower aversion to risk than part-time 
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, and that part-time entrepreneurs are not significantly different in terms of risk attitudes than 
non-entrepreneurs.  
                                                                                 
32 Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2006] examine the properties of the MPL procedure in detail, and the older literature using it. 
Harrison and Rutström [2008a] evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of alternative elicitation procedures for risk attitudes. 
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Holm, Opper and Nee [2013] and Sandri, Schade, Musshoff and Odeling [2010] are agnostic about parametric specifications of 
utility and probability weighting functions, and use the number of safe choices in the MPL as the dependent variable.33 Holm, Opper and 
Nee [2013] use a randomly selected sample of entrepreneurs from local business registers in the Yangzi delta region in China. The sample 
contains 700 entrepreneurs who have been in business for at least three years and employ at least 10 salaried workers, and the control group 
consists of 200 individuals selected randomly from household registers in the same region. The stakes in the lotteries vary between 15 and 580 
Chinese yuan, and are in the same range as the median daily income for the entrepreneurs in the sample. They find that entrepreneurs do not 
have significantly lower risk aversion than subjects in the control group: using data and statistical tests at the individual level, there is no 
significant difference in the average switch point in the MPL between the two groups. Sandri, Schade, Musshoff and Odeling [2010] find 
similar results using a sample of 15 founders of high-tech enterprises in Berlin-Adlershof and a control group of 84 students and non-students 
at Humboldt University. The stakes in the lotteries are not reported, and they do not find any significant difference in risk attitudes between 
entrepreneurs and the control group.  
The random lottery pair design is used by List and Mason [2011] to infer risk attitudes of CEOs working in the coffee industry in 
Costa Rica. This design was used by Hey and Orme [1994] to estimate utility functionals for individuals under EUT and RDU, inter alia, and 
is a popular method for individual-level estimation since one can include a large number of binary choice tasks in the experimental design. List 
and Mason [2011] presented the subjects with 40 pairs of lotteries in which the stakes were losses34 of $80, $30 or $0 for a group of 29 CEOs 
and losses of $8, $3 or $0 for a control group of 101 undergraduate students in Costa Rica. They estimate risk attitudes for each individual and 
find no evidence of a significant difference in risk attitudes between CEOs and students under the assumption of EUT. However, List and 
Mason [2011] find a statistically significant difference in behavior between CEOs and students when the EUT model is replaced by RDU. It is 
not clear in what way risk attitudes differ between CEOs and students, and the comparison of risk attitudes between the two groups could be 
facilitated  by using structural estimation of utility and probability weighting functions. Hence, the evidence in List and Mason [2011] does 
not point to any significant differences in risk attitudes between CEOs and students under EUT, but they conclude that there may be some 
significant differences in risk attitudes under RDU.  
                                                                                 
33 This dependent variable is correlated with risk premia, but does not allow one to say how much of any risk premia derives from 
diminishing marginal utility or probability pessimism. 
34 These were losses from earnings in an unrelated, prior experimental task. 
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  Finally, Macko and Tyszka [2009] use an ordered lottery selection design developed by Binswanger [1980][1981]. Each subjects is 
presented with a choice of 6 lotteries and asked to select one. The payoffs to subjects in the decision tasks are lottery entry tickets to a local 
Polish lottery, so the incentives involved in these tasks are a compound lottery beyond the risk involved in the decision task with lottery 
tickets. They compare risk attitudes among three groups of students: (i) 42 students who did not express any intention of starting up a 
business, (ii) 44 students who had an intention of starting a business, and (iii) 40 students who had already started a business. Using integer 
values for the 6 lotteries in the decision task as the dependent variable, Macko and Tyszka [2009] do not find a statistically significant 
difference in risk attitudes between the three different student groups.35 
                                                                                 
35 They assign integer values between 1 and 6 to the lottery chosen and report an F-test of the statistical hypothesis. It is not clear if this test 
uses an ordered logit model, an ordinary least squares model, or some other measure of association. 
The evidence from experimental designs thus far is mixed with respect to differences in risk attitudes between entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs. 
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